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local levels, State Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism 
Liaisons help bridge gaps in intergovernmental 
intelligence sharing capabilities. Notwithstanding 
this functional bridge between the gaps of federal, 
state, and local government intelligence sharing, 
local law enforcement has a pressing need to develop 
strategic intelligence strategies. After exploring the 
basic construction of strategic intelligence in the 
law enforcement community, one will notice areas 
in which strategic intelligence could be tactically 
applied. Upon gaining a basic understanding of 
underdeveloped applications of strategic intelligence 
on the local level, new research, writing, analysis, 
and discussion must be conducted to maximize 
this potential. 
 Intelligence and analysis are woven together in 
a complex system of problem solving which begins 
with data collection and its dissection, evaluation, 
and interpretation, in order to calculate threats, risks, 
patterns, and opportunities. Strategic intelligence is 
a specific form of research and analysis that allows 
organizations to assess and describe threats, risks, 
and opportunities in such a manner that helps 
shape or determine programs.4 Strategic intelligence 
answers the question, “What can we do about it at 
a practical level?”5 It is essential to recognize that in 
the context of local enforcement agencies, strategic 
intelligence is a function of program and policy 
decisions spanning a broad range of time. Strategic 
intelligence, in the context of enforcement, seems 
to complement operational (tactical) intelligence. 
Whereas operational intelligence is concerned with 
day-to-day activities and specific individual targets, 
strategic intelligence continues from that point toward 
the identification of crime trends affecting the law 
enforcement community, both locally and as a whole. 
Strategic intelligence is a powerful management tool 
for police practitioners. An expert on the subject aptly 
states that, “…unless management is committed to 
acquiring strategic insights into problem solving, 
there is little likelihood of real change driven by 
analysts themselves doing strategic research.”6 
4  McDowell, Don. Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, 
Managers, and Users. (Lantham: Scarecrow Press, 2008), 5.
5  Ibid, 5.
6  Ibid, 7.
 Certainly, the incorporation of tactical, 
operational, and strategic intelligence into local 
applications in the form of intelligence-led policing 
(ILP) is not new to the law enforcement community. 
The Bureau of Justice Assistance sponsored research 
entitled Intelligence–Led Policing: The New 
Intelligence Architecture from as early as 2005.7  An 
effective argument could be made that applications of 
operational/tactical and strategic intelligence are not 
mutually exclusive; rather, they overlap at their fringes. 
A logical starting point from which to capitalize on 
the intersection of local law enforcement, operational 
intelligence, and strategic intelligence is found in the 
implementation of Community Oriented Policing 
and Problem Solving (COPPS) and CompStat.  
 The U.S. Department of Justice Community 
Oriented Policing Services (USDOJCOPS) 
describes three key components to community 
policing: community partnerships, organizational 
transformation, and problem solving.8 Those in 
law enforcement recognize the problem-solving 
component in the acronym “SARA”: scanning, 
analysis, response, and assessment.  Those in academia 
can relate this type of model to learning organizations, 
double loop learning, and the work of Argyris and 
Schon9 and Senge.10 According to USDOJCOPS, 
Community Policing and Problem Solving (COPPS) is 
a philosophy that “promotes organizational strategies, 
which support the systematic use of partnerships and 
problem solving techniques, to proactively address 
the immediate conditions that give rise to public 
safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear 
of crime.”11  Although this DOJ definition concerns 
itself with immediate conditions, the three key 
components of community policing suggests more of 
an overarching, long-range objective. Paradigm shifts 
 
7  Intelligence – Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture. United 
State Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, 2005. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210681.pdf, 
(accessed 25 April 2012).
8  Community Policing Defined. United States Department of Justice, Com-
munity Oriented Policing Services. http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.
asp?Item=36, (accessed 25 April 2012).
9  Argyris, Chris and Donald Schon. Organizational Learning: A Theory of 
Action Perspective. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
10  Senge, Peter M. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learn-
ing Organization. (New York: Doubleday Currency, 1990).
11  Community Policing Defined.
Strategic intelligence 
in Local applications:
Evidences and Opportunities
There is no denying the interrelatedness of federal, 
state, and local governments with respect to the war on 
terror. Strategic intelligence is interwoven in the process 
of this war, and there are certainly optimized practices 
and lessons learned from strategic intelligence that can 
be applied to the accomplishment of the organizational 
missions of local criminal justice agencies. There are 
several evidences of the strategic intelligence function in 
local criminal justice agencies that are pivotal to discuss. 
However, many agencies may not be using strategic 
intelligence to its fullest potential and capability. 
 In 1997, Virginia Beach Police officers served a 
search warrant for an apartment complex across the 
street from Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek – 
Fort Story. Several AK-47s, as well as photographs of 
the base’s fence line and gate guard area were located in 
the search.1  Again in 1997, Charles Deans and Mark 
Elliott robbed more than 20 businesses in numerous 
cities in the Hampton Roads region of Virginia.2 In 
an unrelated matter, Mohammed Atta and Marwin 
Al-Shehhi travelled to Virginia Beach, Va., on Feb. 19, 
2001.3 They rented a mailbox in Virginia Beach and 
cashed a check, and then in April 2001, they returned 
to Virginia Beach to close the mailbox they had rented. 
In 2007, a gentleman walked into a Virginia Beach 
Police Precinct to complain about being harassed by 
police officers. During his statement, he mentioned 
that he is from Iraq, that he could be considered a 
radical Muslim, and that he knew the Constitution 
of the United States better than most U.S. citizens. 
More chilling was his statement that he used the 
Constitution to his (radical) benefit.  Since the war 
on terror began, Westboro Baptist Church has staged 
several demonstrations in the City of Virginia Beach 
 
1  (self, author testimony)
2  Commonwealth of Virginia v. Charles Deans, Jr., http://wasdmz2.courts.
state.va.us/CJISWeb/circuit.html. Search Virginia Beach Circuit; input 
Court Case Number CR97004281-00 (Filed 1997). 
3  The 9/11 Commission Report. National Commission on Terrorist At-
tacks Upon the United States. 2004. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/
report/911Report.pdf, (accessed 25 April 2012).
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in order to protest soldiers who have died in the 
war on terror. In 2011, four groups of burglars were 
responsible for more than 60 burglaries per month 
in a burglary spree in just one zone of a single police 
precinct. From 1997 to 2011, the City of Virginia 
Beach experienced well more than 200 homicides, 
9,000 robberies, 1,200 rapes, 25,000 burglaries, 
9,000 auto thefts, and 150,000 larcenies. This is just 
an example of one city in the United States over a 
narrow span of time.
 While it may seem that the previous paragraph 
is disjointed and lacking in theme or unifying 
connection, it is, in fact, what transpired beyond the 
words which give it relevance. In a mere 286 words, 
many criminal justice agencies are represented behind 
the scenes: 
	 •	Virginia	Beach	PD	 •	Chesapeake	PD
	 •	Norfolk	PD		 •	Portsmouth	PD
	 •	FBI	 	 •	Joint	Terrorism	Task	Force
Many others, including the Virginia State Police and 
NCIS could also be noted for their added support 
from the VCIN and LINX databases.  Moreover, the 
various personnel assigned to tasks that directly act on 
the incidents above or support those who are acting 
on those incidents would be well beyond the scope 
of this article. The same agencies, along with their 
subsidiaries and employees, during the time span 
above had a vast amount of information available 
to them from both the open source arena as well as 
secure databases.   
 There are various types of intelligence, two 
of which are commonly employed in local law 
enforcement.  Operational intelligence applies to the 
routine, everyday workings of the jurisdiction, while 
tactical intelligence is more situation-specific; their 
applications are often specialized and divided between 
the duties of regular officers and those of SWAT teams. 
While local criminal justice organizations are familiar 
with operational and tactical levels of intelligence, 
when the term strategic intelligence is mentioned, one 
can easily draw the lines between Atta and Al-Shehhi 
and the use of intelligence. The hosts of agencies that 
support the intelligence function on the national 
level commonly come to mind.  On the state and 
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§	If so, have optimized practices been 
discovered and developed?
§	Are strategic intelligence functions being 
integrated with CompStat to their full 
potential? 
§	For agencies not currently incorporating 
strategic intelligence into their CompStat 
process, how could they most effectively 
synthesize the two concepts?       
 The International Association of Law Enforcement 
Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) and the United States 
Department of Justice produced a booklet entitled 
Law Enforcement Analytic Standards 2012, which 
clarifies some of the intelligence sources. For law 
enforcement organizations which may not be well-
versed in intelligence and its processes, the IALEIA 
and the DOJ note the following sources or areas 
of analysis:14
	 •	bank,	business,	and	telephone	records
	 •	activity,	commodity,	and	event	flows
	 •	associations	 	•	source	and	application	of	funds
	 •	net	worth	 	•	vulnerability
	 •	organization	 	•	statistics
	 •	conversation			•	geography
	 •	visuals	 	•	investigations
	 •	time	series	 	•	frequency	distribution
	 •	crime	pattern		•	threat	warnings
 One must ask what other methods could be 
added to bolster the strategic intelligence ability of 
local law enforcement agencies, as well as how these 
methods could be used in Community Policing and 
Problem Solving  (COPPS). How these methods 
could be used in the CompStat process is yet another 
area to explore. A final pair of considerations is asking 
which other local law enforcement areas could find 
strategic intelligence to be useful, and what training is 
needed for analysts and decision makers alike in order 
 
 
14  Law Enforcement Analytic Standards. United States Department of 
Justice and the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Analysts. 2012. it.ojp.gov/documents/law_enforcement_analytic_stan-
dards.pdf, (accessed 25 April 2012).
to understand the place and applications of strategic 
intelligence on their levels. 
 Following the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, federal, 
state, local law enforcement, and intelligence agencies 
found themselves bound together in a unified 
mission. Pathways for information sharing among 
the various agencies in all levels of government were 
formed as each agency began to work more closely 
with its peers. There has been ample demonstration 
of the evidence of and need for strategic intelligence 
implementation in local law enforcement agencies. 
The use of Community Policing and Problem Solving 
(COPPS) methods and CompStat show promise for 
the application of strategic intelligence. Professionals 
using COPPS and CompStat must ask whether or not 
they are using the strategic intelligence function to its 
fullest capacity; likewise, professionals not utilizing 
strategic intelligence to complement their COPPS 
or CompStat process should consider including 
this function in order to maximize their results.  All 
local law enforcement professionals should search 
within their own organizations for opportunities to 
use the strategic intelligence function to enhance 
their organizational mission fulfillment.   In doing 
so, they may discover the key to greater effectiveness 
in protecting and serving their jurisdictions and the 
United States as a whole.
in law enforcement organizations, within the realm of 
police and community relations, and the context of 
the social change needed in a community to address 
crime, social disorder, and fear of crime, are not 
immediate conditions. These shifts occur over time 
with sound, informed policy decisions.    
 Intelligence as a whole is problem solving that 
involves data gathering, analysis, interpretations, 
and a look forward to threats, risks, patterns, and 
opportunities. Strategic intelligence is a specific form 
of research and analysis that allows organizations to 
assess and describe threats, risks, and opportunities 
in such a manner as to help shape or determine 
programs and policies. Hence, the unified concept 
of community policing, intelligence, and strategic 
intelligence is a natural fit.  Yet, this logically invites 
several questions to explore:
§	For an individual agency using strategic 
intelligence, what can be done on a 
practical level to accomplish the mission 
of community policing?
§	Are there any evidences of strategic 
intelligence supporting community 
policing efforts?
§	If there are indeed evidences of Strategic 
intelligence supporting COP, have 
optimal practices been developed? 
§	Are strategic intelligence functions being 
applied to their maximum potential with 
respect to community policing? 
§	For agencies not currently integrating 
strategic intelligence into their community 
policing philosophies, how could the two 
concepts be blended most effectively?
These questions should provide a springboard of 
thought for future articles on applications of strategic 
intelligence in local-level criminal justice community 
policing programs. The interaction of intelligence 
work in support of community policing should 
not be discounted in gaining a greater capability to 
 
concentrate on solving problems by providing clarity 
on trends, changes, threats, and opportunities.  
CompStat is a tool familiar to most criminal 
justice practitioners. There are a growing number 
of local police departments employing CompStat to 
address crime in their jurisdictions.  There are four key 
CompStat principles: accurate and timely intelligence, 
effective tactics, rapid deployment of resources, and 
relentless follow-up and assessment.12  At first glance 
one might assess CompStat as more of a function of 
operational intelligence. However, upon participation 
in dozens of CompStat meetings and utilizing the 
CompStat process for patrol plan development, it 
is reasonable to affirm that the process encompasses 
the operational intelligence realm and the realm of 
police work which “assess and describe threats, risks, 
and opportunities in such a manner that helps shape 
or determine programs and policies.”13 The CompStat 
process looks at past crime data, future trend analysis, 
as well as present and future operational capacity to 
assist short- and long-term policy decisions on the 
deployment of resources.  For the practitioner, there 
is even an individual area commander responsibility 
component as well. The CompStat process has 
resulted in significant percentages of personnel 
deployment shifts over a considerable allotment of 
time. Additionally, through data-driven analysis, 
the utilization of CompStat has been responsible for 
significant policy changes in some departments.         
Again, it is noteworthy to consider that the 
CompStat process includes both components of 
operational intelligence and strategic intelligence. 
Furthermore, in the CompStat process there seem to 
be common threads connecting familiar terms such 
as evidenced-based policing as well as less familiar 
terms including strategic intelligence, operational 
intelligence, and Argyris, Schon, and Senge’s 
Learning Organizations. This again leads to questions 
of viability: 
§	Are there any evidences of strategic 
intelligence reinforcing CompStat? 
12  Karen Hess and Christine Orthmann. Introduction to Law Enforcement 
and Criminal Justice. (Clifton Park, NY: Cengage, 2009), 260.
13  McDowell, 5.
